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Abstract—Cloud systems are becoming more complex
and vulnerable to attacks. Cyber attacks are also becoming
more sophisticated and harder to detect. Therefore, it is
increasingly difficult for a single cloud-based intrusion
detection system (IDS) to detect all attacks, because of
limited and incomplete knowledge about attacks. The
recent researches in cyber-security have shown that a co-
operation among IDSs can bring higher detection accuracy
in such complex computer systems. Through collaboration,
a cloud-based IDS can consult other IDSs about suspi-
cious intrusions and increase the decision accuracy. The
problem of existing cooperative IDS approaches is that
they overlook having untrusted (malicious or not) IDSs
that may negatively effect the decision about suspicious
intrusions in the cloud. Moreover, they rely on a cen-
tralized architecture in which a central agent regulates
the cooperation, which contradicts the distributed nature
of the cloud. In this paper, we propose a framework
that enables IDSs to distributively form trustworthy IDSs
communities. We devise a novel decentralized algorithm,
based on coalitional game theory, that allows a set of
cloud-based IDSs to cooperatively set up their coalition
in such a way to make their individual detection accuracy
increase, even in the presence of untrusted IDSs.
Keywords-Intrusion detection systems; game theory;
cloud computing; security; trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud-based cyber-attacks are known to be more
complex and harder to detect. It became significantly
more difficult for a traditional single intrusion detection
system, whether it is network-based, hypervisor-based,
or VM-based, to detect all attacks, due to limited knowl-
edge about attacks. Collaboration among intrusion de-
tection systems (IDSs) can be exploited to gain higher
detection accuracy as compared to traditional single IDS
[1]. Through collaboration, IDSs in different regions,
and possibly, belonging to different Cloud Providers
(CPs) can cooperate in such a way that makes them
utilize the expertise of each other to cover and identify
unknown attack patterns.
A cloud-based IDS can be classified into two types;
signature-based and anomaly-based [2]. The former
compares suspicious behavior with known attack pat-
terns. In order to make signature-based effective, the
signature database should be updated frequently. On
the other hand, anomaly-based IDS raises alarms when
unusual and/or unexpected observations are detected.
Anomaly-based IDSs are effective to detect unknown
attacks. Moreover, they do not need a database of known
attacks. However, the shortcoming of using anomaly-
based detection is the relative high false positive rate
compared to the signature-based technique [1]. IDSs
may adopt both techniques to have improved detection
accuracy. However, the detection accuracy is limited by
the amount of knowledge they have (e.g., their security
vendors have). Recent research [1] [3] shows that the
collaborative detection can enhance the detection rate
up to 60%. Through collaboration, an IDS can benefit
from other IDSs expertise by consulting them about
suspicious behavior. The feedback received can be then
used to decide whether to rise an alarm or not.
The main limitation of existing cloud-based cooper-
ative IDS (e.g. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]) is that they work
under the assumption that all IDSs are trustable, which
lets their collaboration systems vulnerable to untrusted
(malicious or not) insiders.
To address the aforementioned problems, we propose
a trust-based framework for cooperative IDS in a multi-
cloud environment. The framework can be summarized
as follows. We enable an IDS to evaluate other IDSs’
trustworthiness. This is done by considering its personal
experience using bayesian inference. After obtaining
IDSs’ trust values, a coalition formation algorithm is
used, that is based on the coalitional game theory
[10]. The algorithm enables IDSs to leave or join a
given coalition in such a way that enhances its chance
to work with trusted IDSs. Thereafter, we propose a
feedback aggregation algorithm, that is based on the
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [11], to enable an IDS
inside a coalition to aggregate feedbacks from different
IDSs about suspicious intruders, which helps make the
optimal decision in terms of detection accuracy.
Unlike similar proposals (e.g. [12]), we adopt a
distributed approach in which each IDS autonomously
makes its own decisions. This, in turn, avoids the
problem of finding a third party that is agreed by all the
IDSs. Also, it reduces the instability inside the coalition
due to a single point of failure. In summary, our work
consists of the following contributions:
∙ Modeling and proposing a framework that en-
ables cloud-based IDSs to distributively form trust-
worthy IDS communities. More specifically, we
present a systematic approach that considers the
trustworthiness of IDSs through creating coopera-
tive IDS.
∙ Proposing a new trust evaluation approach, based
on Bayesian inference, that enables a cloud-based
IDS to evaluate another IDS’s trustworthiness
based on its personal experiences.
∙ Devising an algorithm, based on coalitional game
theory, that enables a set of cloud-based IDSs to
cooperatively establish their coalition in such a
way to increase their individual detection accuracy
in the presence of untrusted IDSs. The proposed
algorithm converges to a Nash-stable situation; that
is, no IDS has an incentive to leave its current
coalition to move to another coalition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we discuss the related work. We present
the trust-based cooperative intrusion detection system
in Section III. In Section IV, we present our empiri-
cal results to show the effectiveness of the proposed
approach. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Cloud-based cooperative IDSs have been proposed in
many works in the past. For example, Lo et al. [13] pro-
pose a cooperative detection approach within the cloud
computing environment. Alerts are exchanged between
the cloud environment nodes (i.e., hosts) whenever an
attack gets detected. They use a rule-based technique
to detect TCP SYN attacks by fetching the threshold
for rule patterns through the initial rule establishment
phase. The main advantage of this approach is that it is
able to distribute the detection overhead between the
cloud nodes. Recently, Teng et al. [14] proposed an
approach that combines two detectors: a feature detector
and a statistical detector. The feature detector uses
SNORT to separate events based on network protocols
(e.g., TCP). The statistical detector cooperates with
the feature detector by using data packets from it to
determine whether an event is an attack or not. If the
rate of packets obtained exceeds the predefine threshold,
then this case will be considered as an attack.
Man and Huh [4] and Singh et al. [5] proposed a co-
operative IDS between cloud computing regions. Their
method allows exchanging alerts from multiple elemen-
tary detectors. In addition, they enable the exchange
of knowledge between interconnected clouds. Ghribi
[6] proposed a middleware IDS. The approach enables
a cooperation between cloud IDS layers: Hypervisor-
based IDS, Network-based IDS and VM-based IDS. If
an attack is detected in a layer, the attack cannot be
executed in the other layers. Chiba et al. [7] introduced
a cooperative network-based cooperative intrusion de-
tection system to identify network attacks in the cloud
environment. This can be done by monitoring network
traffic while maintaining performance and service qual-
ity.
The main limitation of the above mentioned ap-
proaches is that they work in the assumption that all
IDSs are trustable, which makes their collaboration
systems vulnerable to malicious insiders. The aim of
this paper is to present a systematic approach to build
a cloud-based cooperative IDS that adopts trust assess-
ment mechanisms and supports trustworthy aggregation
decisions. The proposed approach should work in the
presence of untrusted cloud-based IDSs .
In a multi-cloud environment, Dermott et al. [12]
proposed a cooperative intrusion detection in federated
cloud environments. They use the Dempster-Shafer
theory of evidence to collect the beliefs provided by
the watching entities. The collected beliefs are used to
make the final decision regarding a possible attack. The
main limitation of this approach is that it is based on
a centralized architecture, whereby a trusted third-party
called broker is responsible for collecting feedback and
managing intrusion detection.
In a non-cloud environment, a cooperative IDS has
also been recently proposed in [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]
[20] [21] [22]. However, these works also have the
limitation of the above mentioned approaches, since
they rely on the assumption that all IDSs are trustable,
which makes their collaboration system vulnerable to
malicious insiders.
A trust-based cooperative IDS has been proposed in a
non-cloud environment. For example, Fung and Zhu [1]
present a trust-based collaborative decision framework.
Through cooperation, a local intrusion detection system
(IDS) can detect new attacks that may be known to other
IDSs, which may be from different security vendors.
They study how to utilize the diagnosis from different
IDSs to perform intrusion detection. They present a
system architecture of a collaborative IDS in which
trustworthy feedback aggregation is a key component.
Similarly, Zhu et al. [23] [24] proposed an incentive-
based communication protocol, which provides IDS
nodes incentives to send feedbacks to their peers, and
thus to prevent malicious behaviors. The main limi-
tation of the existing trust-based cooperative IDS is
that it considers a consultation request to be sent to
many IDSs in order to get a feedback. This in turn
causes extra overhead, through consulting needlessly
some IDSs (i.e., untrusted IDSs). This is unlike our
approach, where we use a coalitional game, in order
to construct a set of trusted IDSs and thus minimise
the number of consultation requests while guaranteeing
higher detection accuracy.
In general, for a multi-cloud environment, a decen-
tralized framework that considers trustworthiness of
IDSs during the cooperation had yet to be addressed.
Thus, in this paper, we present a trust-based cooperative
IDS in a multi cloud environment. This in turn, en-
hances the detection accuracy compared to the existing
cooperative and non-cooperative IDSs.
III. THE PROPOSED TRUST-BASED COOPERATIVE
IDS
In this section, we present a trust-based cooperative
IDS in a multi-cloud environment. The section is di-
vided into the following subsections: trust evaluation,
trust-based coalition formation algorithm and feedback
aggregation (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1: Proposed Methodology
A. Trust Evaluation
A cloud-based IDS can evaluate the trust value of
another IDS based on its personal experience with
that IDS. We adopt a Bayesian inference approach to
compute the trust value of an IDS [25]. The Bayesian
inference was chosen because it is well-founded to
derive trust values [26]. When the cloud-based IDS
consults another IDS regarding a suspicious intruder, the
received feedback and the revealed result (i.e., attack or
not) are used to update the trust value of the consulted
IDS. The trust value can be promoted if the IDS
successfully diagnosed the consultation request about
a suspicious intruder and it can be demoted otherwise.
The trust value here represents and shows the accuracy
of the IDS diagnosing suspicious attacks. An IDS i ∈
N , where N is a set of IDSs, is endowed with a belief
function, which computes the trust level of another IDS
j ∈ N . The new trust value t ′j is derived from the old
trust value t j as follows:
t ′j = F(t j;α j,β j) (1)
where F is the regularized incomplete beta function
[25], which is also the cumulative beta distribution func-
tion of the following beta probability density function:
f (x;α j,β j) =
xα j−1(1− x)β j−1
B(α j,β j)
(2)
B represents the complete beta function. The value
of α j and β j are updated after receiving the feedback
from an IDS j. β j is increased when the IDS j suc-
cessfully diagnoses the consultation request. Equation
(4) describes the update of β j.
β j = β j × (1+ρ j) (3)
where ρ j represents the weight of the diagnosed
consultation request if it is successful and 0 if not.
Equation (4) describes the update of α j.
α j = α j × (1+ γ j) (4)
where γ j denotes the weight of the diagnosed con-
sultation request if it is unsuccessful and 0 if not.
The values of ρ j and γ j should be carefully set by
an IDS i who is requesting feedback about a suspi-
cious attack from other IDSs. These values reflect the
detection difficulty degree of the suspicious intruder. A
higher value of β j will increase the trust of an IDS j
while a higher value of α j will decrease it.
The initial trust value t j is obtained at the beginning
during the testing period. The total reported diagnosis
data from peer IDS j is denoted by the set M j. The
initial trust value represents the total number of consul-
tation requests that have been successfully diagnosed






Where the parameter r j,k is the revealed result of
the k-th diagnosis request: r j,k =1 indicates successful
diagnosis of the k-th request. r j,k =0 indicates otherwise.
The initial value of α and β can be obtained as
follows:
α j = ∑
k∈M j
(1− r j,k) (6)
β j = ∑
k∈M j
(r j,k) (7)
B. A Trust-based Coalition Formation
In this section, we model the problem of cooperative
IDS as a coalition formation cooperative game with
non-transferable utility [27].
1) Characterization: The proposed coalition forma-
tion algorithm is a hedonic coalitional game [27], [28]
[29] [30], a category of coalition formation games
[10], [28], [31] in which each agent (i.e. IDS) acts
selfishly, and its preferences for a coalition depend only
on the members of that coalition. A hedonic game is
used due to the fact that finding the optimal coalition
structure, in coalition formation, is NP-complete [32].
Therefore, a hedonic game, which satisfies stability
features was used. Stability indicates that none of the
coalition members (i.e. IDSs) finds an incentive to leave
its current coalition and join another one.
To establish the model, a preference relation
function is defined. This allows each IDS to order and
to compare all the possible coalitions it belongs in
order to make preferences over them. For any IDS i ∈
N , where N is a set of IDSs, a preference relation
≻i is defined as a transitive binary relation over the set
of all coalitions that IDS i can form [27]. Specifically,
for any IDS i ∈ N , and given two coalitions C1, C2,
the notation C1 ≻i C2 means that IDS i prefers being
a member of C1 rather than C2.
In our coalition formation game, the preference func-
tion of the IDSs can be defined as follows:
C1 રi C2 ⇐⇒ fi(C1)≥ fi(C2) (8)
where C1, C2 ⊆ N are two coalitions containing IDS
i, and fi(.) is a preference function defined as follows:





i is denoted as the coalition trust criterion.
T ji is denoted as IDS i beliefs in IDS j ∈ N . IDS
i’s beliefs in Ck’s members is obtained using Bayesian
inference as in (1). We use the product of IDSs trust
values instead of their summation in the definition of the
coalition trust criterion in order to conserve the effect
of small trust values on the global coalitions trust value.
That way, the impact of a small trust value will not be
mitigated by a higher one.
2) The Proposed Coalition Formation Algorithm:
The algorithm (Algorithm 1) that we propose is based
on the hedonic shift rule [27]: let Π = {C1, ...,Cl}
represent the set of coalition partitions. That is, for k
= {1, 2, . . . , l}, each Ck ⊆ N is a disjoint coalition.
Each IDS i ∈ N decides to leave its current coalition
CΠ(i) to join another one Ck ∈ Π∪φ if and only if its
coalition trust criterion (i.e., Ui(Ck) = ∏ j∈Ck T
j
i ) in the
new coalition exceeds the one it obtains in its current
coalition. Leaving and joining decisions are considered
selfish decisions. This means that they are made without
considering their effect on the other IDSs.
Algorithm 1: Trust-based Coalition Formation
Algorithm
Given the current coalition partition
Πc = {C1, ...,Cl}, each IDS i evaluates possible
shift from its current coalition as follows:
repeat
foreach Ck ∈ Πc ∪φ do
foreach IDS j ∈Ck do
∙ calculate the trust value
of IDS j.
calculate Ui(Ck ∪{i}) and Ui(CΠc(i))
if Ui(Ck ∪{i}) > Ui(CΠc(i)) then
∙ IDS i leaves its current
coalition CΠc(i) and
joins the new coalition.
∙ Πc is updated:
Πc+1 := (Πc ∖{CΠc(i),Ck})
∪{CΠc(i)∖{i},Ck ∪{i}}.
else
∙ IDS i remains in the
same coalition so that:
Πc+1 := Πc
until ε elapses;
In Algorithm 1, an IDS i evaluates all of the possible
coalitions it can join or form, beginning by leaving its
current coalition CΠ(i) to join another already existing
coalition Ck. The algorithm computes the trust value
for each IDS j ∈ Ck as in (1). Then, the algorithm
determines the coalition trust criterion Ui(CΠ(i)) of its
current coalition CΠ(i) as in (9) and compares it with the
coalition trust criterion Ui(Ck) of the coalition Ck. If the
coalition trust criterion of the current coalition is greater
than that of the coalition Ck, then the IDS i leaves its
current coalition to join Ck. Otherwise, IDS i remains
in its current coalition. One should note that, after a
certain fixed period of time ε , the whole process is
repeated, in order to obtain the changes that may happen
in the current coalition partition Πc. These changes
include changes in the IDSs trust values, the departure
of existing IDSs and the arrival of new IDSs.
The main complexity of Algorithm 1 lies in the
shifting operations, i.e. the process of finding a new
coalition to join, which equals O(∣Πc∣), where ∣Πc∣
is the number of coalitions in the current coalition
partition.
The algorithm can be implemented in a distributed
manner, given that each IDS can act autonomously
and independently from any other IDSs in the system.
However, it is important to provide appropriate actions
based on [33] for:
∙ State recovery: the algorithm assumes that each
IDS is able to retrieve the current coalition partition
Πc. Any state retrieval algorithm available in the
state-of-the-art (e.g. [34], [35]) can be used for this
purpose;
∙ Atomic state update: to guarantee correctness, Πc
must not change while IDS i moves from its current
coalition CΠ(i) and joins another one. Distributed
mutual exclusion algorithms (e.g. [36]) can be used
for this purpose.
C. Trust Aggregation
In the previous section, we presented a trust-based
coalition formation model that enables a set of cloud-
based IDSs to cooperatively set up their coalitions. The
output of the coalition formation algorithm (Algorithm
1) is a set of coalitions, where each coalition consists of
a set of IDSs that prefer to work with each other. In this
section, we show how an IDS inside a coalition can ag-
gregate feedbacks received from other IDSs in the same
coalition. For this purpose, we use the Dempster-Shafer
Theory (DST) for feedback aggregation. DST was se-
lected for the following two reasons: (1) unlike other
aggregation models (e.g. Bayesian aggregation model)
that demand complete information of prior probabilities,
DST can handle a lack of complete information (i.e.
uncertainty), and (2) it has the property of preventing
collusion attacks, which occur when several malicious
IDSs collaborate to give misleading judgments.
In our model, the frame of discernment, which de-
scribes the status of a suspicious intrusion (hypothesis)
is Ω= {1,0,U}. In this set, 1 means that IDS j decides
and reports to IDS i that there is an intrusion, 0 means
that IDS j decides and reports to IDS i that there is no
intrusion, and U shows that IDS j is uncertain whether
there is an intrusion or not. Each hypothesis is assigned
a basic probability value (bpv) between 0 and 1, which
is equal to the credibility score believed by the IDS
giving the judgement.
DST combines multiple IDSs beliefs under the condi-
tion that evidences from different IDSs are independent.
For example, if IDSi wants to combine the belief of
two IDSs IDS1 and IDS2 over the same frame of
discernment Ω, the combined belief of IDS1 and IDS2























Here is an example. Assume the following:
mIDS1(1) = 0.75 mIDS1(0) = 0 mIDS1(U) = 0.25
mIDS2(1) = 0.6 mIDS2(0) = 0 mIDS2(U) = 0.4
by combining the above two belief functions, we can
obtain the result as follows:
belie f (1) = (0.75 ∗ 0.6) + (0.75 ∗ 0.4) + (0.6 ∗ 0.25) =
0.9
belie f (0) = (0∗0)+(0∗0.4)+(0∗0.25) = 0
belie f (U) = (0.25∗0.4) = 0.1
Since belie f (1) > belie f (0) > belie f (U), IDS i will
decide that an attack exists.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we first explain the experimental setup
used to perform our experimentation and then study
the performance of the proposed cooperative intrusion
detection approach.
A. Experimental Setup
We implemented our framework in a 64-bit Windows
8 environment on a host equipped with an Intel Core
i7-4790 CPU 3.60 GHz Processor and 16 GB RAM.
We used Matlab for implementing our model.
The simulation environment uses 100 cloud-based
IDSs. Each IDS is represented by two parameters,
trust value t and decision threshold τ . The trust value
represents the expertise level of the IDS, which in turn
represents the ability of the IDS to catch suspicious
traces from a given observation. The threshold τ repre-
sents the sensitivity (i.e., accuracy) of the IDS. Lower
values of τ indicate a more sensitive IDS.
We use a Beta density function to reflect the intru-
sion detection capability of each IDS. A Beta density
function is given by:












d(1− t) (1− r)
(15)
where z ∈ [0, 1] is the assessment result from the
IDS about the likelihood of intrusion, and f (z∣α ,β )
is the distribution of assessment z from an IDS with
trust level t to an intrusion with difficulty level d ∈ [0,
1]. The trust level in the distribution can represent the
expertise level of the IDS. Higher values of d represent
these attacks that are difficult to detect. Higher values
of t indicate a higher probability of generating correct
intrusion assessments. r ∈ {0, 1} is the expected result
of detection. r = 1 means that there is an intrusion and
r = 0 means otherwise.
In order to evaluate the ability of the proposed model
in the presence of an untrusted environment, We made
the percentage of untrusted IDSs 70% (trust level t ≤
0.2). We argue, based on the recent literature [38], that
the percentage of untrusted nodes tends to form the
majority compared to that of trusted nodes. We applied
the proposed coalition formation algorithm (Algorithm
1) on the considered IDSs. We compared the proposed
aggregation approach with other known aggregation
approaches in the state-of-the-art: Majority aggregation
model [13] and the weighted average aggregation model
[39]. In the majority model, the IDS collects feedback
from IDSs about suspicious behaviour and the decision
is made (i.e., attack or not) according to the majority.
However, in the weighted average aggregation model,
weights W are assigned to feedbacks from different
IDSs to distinguish their detection capability. Highly
trusted IDSs are assigned with larger weights compared
to low trusted IDSs. The decision is made according to
the following equation. If (ΣNk=1 Wkyk) / (Σ
N
k=1 Wk) ≥
τ , the decision is the existence of an attack. Otherwise,
the decision is that there is no attack, where Wk is the
weight of the k-th IDS and yk is the feedback from the
k-th IDS.
B. Experimental Results
In Fig. 2, we observe that the proposed aggrega-
tion model (i.e., Dempster-Shafer aggregation approach)
shows significant improvement for the false negative
rate, compared to the weighted and majority aggregation
model at different threshold values τ . Similarly, in Fig.
3, our model yields significant improvement for the
false positive rate, compared to the other two models.
This is due to the fact that Dempster-Shafer ignores
the untrustworthy feedbacks upon making the final
decisions. Moreover, Dempster-Shafer gives a weight
for each feedback according to the trustworthiness level
of the IDS giving this feedback.



























Fig. 2: Comparison of three aggregation models (False Negative Rate).


























Fig. 3: Comparison of three aggregation models (False Positive Rate).
In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we also study the effect of the
trust value (i.e., expertise level) on the accuracy of the
detection. To this end, we run our Algorithm (Algorithm
1) many times. Each time, we let IDSs have different
values of t. The study is conducted at different threshold
values τ . Fig. 4 shows that the false negative decreases
when the trustworthiness level of an IDS increases.
Similarly, Fig. 5 shows that the false positive decreases
when the trustworthiness level of an IDS increases. This
is justified by the fact that whenever an IDS becomes
more trusted, it will be able to give a right feedback
about suspicious attacks.
Fig. 6 gives a comparison between the proposed
trust-based coalitional game approach and the trust-
based grand coalition approach. The latter considers all

























Fig. 4: False Negative vs. Trust Value t .
























Fig. 5: False Positive vs. Trust Value t.
existing IDSs during the cooperation. In other words,
the coalition is done among all IDSs. Thus, the feed-
back is received from all IDSs and the final decisions
are made using the same proposed aggregation model
(i.e., Dempster-Shafer). This is unlike our approach
where we first run a coalition formation Algorithm
(Algorithm 1) and minimise the number of IDSs inside
the coalition. The figure shows the superiority of the
proposed model for both the false positive and false

















Trust-based Coalitional Game (Our model)
Trust-based Grand Coalition
Fig. 6: Comparison of two coalition formation models.
negative rates. This is due to the fact that the proposed
coalition approach minimises the number of untrusted
IDSs inside each generated coalition. Thus, the received
feedback is more likely to reflect the real status of any
suspicious behaviour, whether it is a real attack or not.
However, for the grand coalition approach, the feedback
is received from every existing IDS. Therefore, there
will be a chance of receiving incorrect feedback from
untrusted IDSs. Fig. 6 also studies the cost associated
with using each approach. The cost represents the time
needed to make a judgment about a suspicious attack.
The result is projected in a range between 0 and 1.
Our model yields a minimum overhead compared to
the grand coalition approach. The reason is that our
model minimises unnecessary consultation requests by
consulting only those trusted IDSs in the final coalition.
This is unlike the grand coalition approach where a
consultation request is sent to all existing IDSs.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates a novel trust-based coopera-
tive IDS in a multi-cloud environment. We propose a
coalitional game-theoretic framework. The framework
enables an IDS to evaluate the trust value of other IDSs
using bayesian inference. We devise a coalition forma-
tion algorithm, that is based on the coalitional game
theory. The algorithm enables IDSs to leave or join a
given coalition in such a way that enhances their ability
to work with trusted IDSs. The proposed algorithm
converges to a Nash-stable situation; that is, no IDS
has an incentive to leave its current coalition to move to
another coalition. Furthermore, we propose a feedback
aggregation algorithm, that is based on Dempster-Shafer
Theory (DST), to enable an IDS inside a coalition to
aggregate feedbacks about suspicious attacks in order
to make the optimal decision in terms of detection
accuracy. Numerical results show the effectiveness of
the proposed approach in terms of false positive and
false negative rates, and cost.
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